Showing posts with label Global economy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Global economy. Show all posts

Thursday, May 13, 2021

13/5/21: BRIC Composite PMIs April 2021: Recovery Fragile, Inflation Heating Up

April PMIs for BRIC economies show continued strengthening in the recovery in China and Russia, moderation in the recovery momentum in India and deepening collapse in the recovery in Brazil.

Since we are into the first month of the new quarter, there is not enough data to go about to meaningfully analyze quarterly dynamics. Hence, I am only looking at Composite PMIs:


PMIs in April run stronger, compared to 1Q 2021 averages for Russia (Services only), and China (Services and Manufacturing), while Brazil and India recorded deteriorating PMIs in both Manufacturing and Services, and Russia posted weaker Manufacturing PMI.

BRIC as a group underperformed Global PMIs in April in both Services and Manufacturing, although BRIC Services PMI in April was running ahead of Services PMI for 1Q 2021, and there was virtually no change in Manufacturing PMI for BRIC group in April compared to 1Q 2021 average. 

Global Composite PMI in April was 56.3, which is much higher than same period Composite PMIs for Brazil (44.5), Russia (54.0), China (54.7) and India (55.4).

Notable price pressures were marked in:

  • China: "At the same time, inflationary pressures remained strong, with input cost inflation hitting its highest since January 2017, while prices charges rose solidly".
  • India: "Supply-chain constraints and a lack of available materials placed further upward pressure on inflation. Input prices facing private sector companies rose at the sharpest pace in close to nine years. The quicker increase was seen among goods producers. Prices charged by private sector firms increased at the fastest pace since last November, but the overall rate of inflation was modest and much weaker than that seen for input costs."
  • Russia: "The rate of input cost inflation slowed in April to the softest for three months. That said, firms continued to pass on higher costs to their clients, as charges rose at the fastest pace since January 2019".
  • Brazil: "Meanwhile, input costs continued to increase sharply. The rate of inflation was the second-fastest since composite data became available in March 2007, just behind that seen in the previous month. Goods producers noted a stronger rise than service providers for the fifteenth straight month. Prices charged for Brazilian goods and services rose further, stretching the current sequence of inflation to nine months. The upturn was sharp and the fastest in the series history. The acceleration reflected a quicker increase in the manufacturing industry".

Thursday, April 8, 2021

8/4/21: BRIC Composite PMIs 1Q 2021: A Mixed Bag for Recovery Votes

 

I covered BRIC Manufacturing PMIs for 1Q 2021 (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/04/5421-brics-manufacturing-pmis-1q-2021.html) and BRIC Services PMIs (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/04/8421-bric-services-pmi-1q-2021-slowing.html) in the two posts earlier.  Now, the round up analysis based on Composite PMIs:

  • Brazil Composite PMI fell from 54.4 in 4Q 2020 to 52.1 in 1Q 2021, marking a slowdown in growth conditions in the economy. Quarterly activity in 1Q 2021 is still ahead of where it was in 3Q 2020 (51.6) and marks third consecutive quarter of growth. But, for the first time during this recovery period, Brazil Composite PMI is now below Global Composite PMI (53.43 in 1Q 2021).
  • Russia Composite PMI increased from recessionary 47.7 in 4Q 2020 to still negative-growth (albeit statistically, indistinguishable from zero growth) 49.5 in 1Q 2021. Russian economy has now posted four quarters of contracting economic growth PMIs out of five quarters of the pandemic. Needless to say, Russian Composite PMIs are remaining well below Global Composite PMI as the did in 4Q 2020 as well.
  • India Composite PMI slipped from 56.4 in 4Q 2020 to 55.7 in 1Q 2021 signaling slower, but still robust growth in the economy. India outperformed Global Composite PMIs in 4Q 2020 and 1Q 2021, the only two quarters of > 50 readings in India's case.
  • China Composite PMI fell from 56.3 in 4Q 2020 to still robust 55.2 in 1Q 2021. Thus, China, like India, managed to outperform Global Composite PMIs in both of the last two quarters. Unlike India, China also beat Global Composite PMIs in 1Q and 2Q 2020 as well. Since Chinese economy was the only BRIC economy to regain its 2019 levels of activity back in 3Q 2020, the last two quarters of PMIs suggest strong rebound in the world's largest economy (or second largest one, depending on how one counts economic output).


8/4/21: BRIC Services PMI 1Q 2021: Slowing Growth Momentum

 Earlier this week, I posted on the latest PMI reports for BRIC economies for Manufacturing sector (https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2021/04/5421-brics-manufacturing-pmis-1q-2021.html).  Now, let's cover Services Sector 1Q 2021 PMIs. Remember, Markit - source of data - cover only monthly PMIs.

As reminder, Manufacturing PMIs fell in all BRIC economies except for Russia in 1Q 2021 compared to 4Q 2020. As the result, overall, BRIC Manufacturing Activity Index (GDP-weighted average of PMIs) fell from 54.8 to 52.8 between 4Q 2020 and 1Q 2021.

In services sector:

  • Brazil Services PMI slipped into a recessionary territory in 1Q 2021, falling from 4Q 2020 reading of 51.4 to 46.1 in 1Q 20201. This marks the lowest reading since 2Q 2020.
  • Russia Services PMI rebounded robustly from 4Q 2020 reading of 47.7 to 1Q 2021 reading of 53.6. Russian Services PMIs have been very volatile during the pandemic period, hitting the low of 32.0 in 2Q 2020 and the high of 56.8 in 3Q 2020.
  • India Services PMI improved from growth-signaling 53.4 in 4Q 2020 to even faster growth-consistent 54.2 in 1Q 2021. India and Russia were the two BRIC economies posting improvements in services sector in 1Q 2021.
  • China Services PMI fell from 'very high growth' signaling reading of 57.0 in 4Q 2020 to moderate growth-signaling 52.6 in 1Q 2021.
  • Overall, BRIC Services Sector Activity Index - a measure I calculate based on Markit PMI data inputs - fell from 54.8 in. 4Q 2020 to 52.6 in 1Q 2021, virtually matching the decline in Manufacturing Sector Activity Index over the same period of time. 
  • BRIC Services Activity Index also underperformed Global Services PMI which average 53.3 in 1Q 2021. In 4Q 2020, BRIC Services Activity Index was ahead of Global Services PMI (54.8 to 52.3).


Wednesday, July 1, 2020

1/7/20: Manufacturing PMIs Q2 2020: BRIC


BRIC economies reported their June manufacturing PMIs, so we can update Q2 2020 data. Here is the chart:


Despite improving PMIs in all BRIC economies through June 2020, quarterly readings remains deeply recessionary in all BRICs except for China.

  • Brazil Manufacturing PMI averaged 40.6 in 2Q 2020 down from 1Q reading of 50.6. Brazil Manufacturing sector growth was slowing down from the start of 4Q 2019 and was showing anaemic growth (statistically, zero growth) in 1Q 2020 before COVID19 restrictions kicked in. June 2020 monthly reading rose, however, to 51.6 - signalling pretty robust growth on a monthly basis for the first time since the end of February. Some good news, but not enough to lift 2Q 2020 average above 50.0 mark.
  • Russia Manufacturing PMI remains below 50.0 in June, as it did consecutively since the end of April 2019. This marks 14 months of continued contraction, only accelerated by COVID19. Quarterly PMI for 2Q 2020 is deep under water at 39.0 - the worst reading in history, matching that of the lows of the 2009 recession in 1Q 2009. June monthly uptick to 49.4 is still leaving Russian Manufacturing index below zero growth mark of 50.0. 
  • India Manufacturing PMI rose from 30.8 in May to 47.2 in June 2020, but remains well below zero growth line. Quarterly index is now at 35.1 for 2Q 2020, which is an all-time low. 
  • China Manufacturing PMI was the only BRIC index to reach into positive growth territory in 2Q 2020, at 50.4. Statistically, this reading is indifferent from zero growth conditions in the sector, however. 
Overall, GDP-shares weighted BRIC Manufacturing index is at 45.0 in 2Q 2020, down from 49.1 in 1Q 2020. Not as bad as 4Q 2008 - 1Q 2009 readings of 43.1 and 43.7, respectively, but bad. Still, BRICs as a group managed to sustain less manufacturing decline than the Global Manufacturing index which collapsed to 43.6 in 2Q 2020 from 48.4 in 1Q 2020.

Saturday, June 27, 2020

26/6/20: Longer-Term Impact of COVID19 on Growth

IMF published updated forecasts this week, and here the summary:

World Economic Outlook, June 2020, Growth Projections table

IMF has stopped doing 5 year forecasts this April, due to uncertainty induced by the COVID19 pandemic. 

Looking at the longer run effects of the pandemic, based on October 2019 (pre-Covid19 trends), and earlier growth trend before the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) puts COVID19 pandemic into historical perspective:



The differences between the above trend lines are telling. 

Globally, GFC resulted in a permanent loss of real income that amounts to a cumulative decline of ca 17 percent over 17 years (2008-2024). COVID19 is forecast to result in additional permanent loss of 3.2 percent within 5 years 2020-2024.

Eurozone has been hit even harder. GFC resulted in a permanent loss of real income to the tune of 12.8 percent while COVID19 is currently set to yield a permanent additional loss of income to the tune of 7.1 percent over less than 1/3rd of the post-GFC trend line duration. 

The numbers above are rather 'indicative', in so far as any and all forecasts past 2020 are perilous at the very best. But you get the picture: we are witnessing two consecutive events that result in permanent deviation of economic activity away from the prior trends. And both events are sharp. Even with a 'V-shaped' recovery, we are in trouble (because a V-shaped recovery taking us into mid-2020 means recovering end-of-2019 levels of economic activity, while losing 1.5-2 years of growth momentum (recall, economy was slowing down in H2 2019 on its own, without COVID19). 

As we say... [ok, well, may we do not say it often, but...] this picture is f*ugly... 


Monday, June 1, 2020

1/6/20: 3 months of COVID19 impact: BRIC Manufacturing PMIs


BRIC Manufacturing PMIs are out for May, showing some marginal improvements in the sector. However, of all four economies, China is the only one that is currently posting activity reading within the statistical range of zero--to-positive growth. Brazil, Russia and India remain deeply underwater.

Please note, these are quarterly PMIs, not monthly, based on GDP-weighted shares of manufacturing sectors and monthly PMI data points. 

Thursday, April 2, 2020

2/4/20: COVID19 in three charts


#COVID2019 economy in three pics:

U.S. unemployment claims, week 2 of filings:

Irish unemployment claims, first month of filings:


 World GDP forecast after one month of Covid pandemic:
FUGLY! All around. 

Friday, January 10, 2020

10/1/20: U.S. Tariffs on European Wines: Inflicting Self-Harm


Next week, the  Office of the US Trade Representative is expected to make a determination on the potential imposition of an up to 100% tariff on imports of wine from Europe. Which is a bad thing for the overall state of the global trade, bad news for the European producers of wine, bad news for the American consumers and their European counterparts, and bad news for the U.S. wine industry. But 'bad things' do not stop there. There will be costs imposed on restaurants and bars. There will be negative spillover effects - in the long run - to the competitiveness of the U.S. wine making industry competitiveness. In other words, the new tariffs are a perfect exemplification of how poor policies in one sector can hammer the entire complex chain of value added across a much broader economy, both in the long run and the short run.

Let's start from the top.

Causes

The reason for the introduction of the tariffs on wines made in Europe - the first wave of which came in in October - has absolutely nothing to do with the wine makers or wine importers or wine consumers. Back in September this year, the WTO Arbitration Panel has ruled that Boeing (the U.S. civilian aircraft manufacturer - in addition to being also a major military-industrial complex player) and Airbus (Boeing's European counterpart) received tens of billions in illegal state supports and subsidies over the period of 15 years. These supports included tax subsidies and credits and subsidised loans. All of which was well known to anyone even remotely familiar with economics of both the EU and the U.S. well before the WTO rulings.

Given the state of the U.S. trade policy (War First, Trade Later) and the fact that Boeing is in a pile of financial problems stemming from its disgraceful handling of the 737 Max scandal, the U.S. rushed out of the stables to mount its trade offensive against the EU. imposing 25% tariff levy against European wine producers. The measure, of course, was 'designed' (if one call it thus) to hurt European economies. Wine industry is iconic for countries like France (Airbus major domicile), Italy (which hasn't much to do with Airbus and was partially spared from the hit) and Spain (another Airbus HQ domicile). Germany also got hit, especially given its well known white wine production. Now, Airbus has also major presence in Mobile, Alabama, USA (where is works on A319, A320 and A321 models) and Mirabel, Canada (A220 model), although Chateau Mobile and the fabled reds of Mirabel were spared by the U.S. trade authorities.

The new round of tariffs - the 100% ones being currently considered - also come on foot of the finding that France’s new digital services tax discriminates against US tech companies, according to USTR, even though the French tax is a de facto precursor to the OECD's Digital Services Tax initiative (covered here: https://trueeconomics.blogspot.com/2019/08/12819-oecd-tax-plans-some-bad-news.html and, in more detail, here: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3406260).

European response to the same triggers was to call for a negotiated resolution of the disputes over Boeing and Airbus. Which, of course, is not how the U.S. does business these days.

First round impact

The first round of sanctions had little impact on the wine makers, hammering instead U.S. supply chain - distributors, warehousing, wholesalers and retail - and U.S. consumers (just in time for the Holidays season). The reason for this is that European producers have a massive latent excess demand for their wines in Asia-Pacific and Eastern and Central Europe, where consumers prefer European wines - by taste, brands and cost points - to the U.S. wines. U.S. distributors and wholesalers took a direct hit: most of the 25% tariff has been absorbed into lower profit margins by the importers.

One of the reasons this worked is that the U.S. demand for wine is growing, which means that for relatively benign tax hikes, suppliers can lower unit margins in hope of compensating with continued growth in demand.


Demand has grown from the recent plateau of 2 gallons pa per person in 1999-2002, to just under 3 gallons in 2018. This margins logic breaks down when tariffs rise above 35-40% mark, making cost pass-through to the consumers virtually unavoidable.

A message from the small wine importing firm, specialising on ESG impact-driven natural wines, makes another case: http://www.jennyandfrancois.com/2019/12/17/wine-tariffs-threaten-our-very-existence/. "These [proposed 100%] tariffs are really without precedent, but to glimpse a window on the possible disastrous consequences, we could examine the 1930 Smoot Hawley Act. History teaches us that this act hastened the arrival of the Great Depression, extended its length, led to a 65% downturn in global trade, and made imported goods a luxury item only affordable to the top 1% of the American population. What’s more, those tariffs were only between 40-48%, not the 100% tariffs currently in discussion. Smoot Hawley is the reason most of the world’s leaders today favor unregulated free trade." And "I spent 20 years of my life building a successful business, and in one signature the Trump administration could make it all crumble."


Killing wine wasn't a great policy back in the 1930s. For everyone involved. Hammering European wine today won't be either.

A wider impact can be seen in the restaurant and catering sector. Here is how disastrous tariffs on wine can be for restaurants business: https://www.postandcourier.com/blog/raskin_around/proposed-wine-tariffs-could-spur-widespread-charleston-restaurant-closures-opponents/article_3a07ee26-2e44-11ea-a9e1-b3eafe8429c4.html. "One downtown Charleston restaurant owner estimates the loss of Prosecco alone would amount to a $57,167 annual revenue loss... Just those drinks hypothetically work out to more than $1,000 a month in server tips, on average. Assuming that loss is equally shared by a 12-person front-of-house crew, each employee would be out approximately $94, or about two-thirds of the average monthly household utility bill in Charleston."

The impact is not lagged: "when the 25 percent tariff was implemented, Root says, “it became part of our working capital immediately. We had to come up with $40,000 unexpectedly” in order to free up wine which had already shipped. But he characterizes a 100 percent tariff as “impossible.”"

Even in the time-sensitive, so less tariff-elastic cases, it is the U.S. businesses that have been absorbing the lion's share of the cost increases, as illustrated by the 2019 vintage of Beaujolais Nouveau release last year that came after the 25% tariff hike of October 2. This is covered well here: https://www.winemag.com/2019/10/29/tariffs-on-european-union-goods-impact-u-s-wine-industry/. In theory, producers should be absorbing more of the tax increase cost in lower elasticity supply cases. But due to supply chain complexity and the fact that producers face global demand, with lots of substitution options, while the U.S. wholesalers, retailer and consumers have inelastic demand (due to timing-sensitive nature of the market for Nouveau releases) this is not the case.

Bad news for the U.S. producers

So higher tariffs on European wines should be a good thing to the American producers of wine, right? After all, as prices of their competitors rise, their products should experience increased demand due to consumer substitution in favor of cheaper alternatives.

This is a fallacious argument, given complexity of the wine business.

Firstly, price-sensitive consumers who have a greater incentive to switch away from European wines toward other alternatives are likely to go for cheaper Chilean and Australian wines instead of the already higher-priced Californian, Oregonian and other U.S. offerings.

Secondly, demand for all wine is likely to decline due to higher prices, but also due to the reduced range of wines that consumers might consider affordable to them. Consumers do not simply buy the wine by the price. Instead, consumers buy, say, California wine because they want something different from the Italian wine, and they buy Italian wine to diversify their consumption (broaden the range of taste options) from French offerings, and they buy French offerings because they have been consuming Spanish ones, and so on, until they reach back to California wines. It is exactly the same with food: making Thai cuisine more expensive does not necessarily mean Italian restaurants will gain more customers. Instead, it might mean that consumers will reduce demand for eating out in all restaurants and switch to fast food instead.

Thirdly, wine business is also complex. U.S. producers innovate and collaborate with European producers. Adversarial trade is not good for technology and intellectual property transfers between them. And U.S. producers are also worried about inevitable EU counter-measures. Worse, if tariffs were to trigger significant drop off in the number of wholesale, retail and restaurant businesses and trading volumes, smaller U.S. producers (who tend to be more innovative and have greater intellectual property investments in the industry) will have fewer channels to sell and market their own offerings. Here is one California wine producer views on the effect of potential decrease in the number of wholesale / distribution partners under the 100% tariffs proposal: https://tablascreek.typepad.com/tablas/2019/12/no-100-tariffs-on-european-wines-wont-be-good-for-california-wineries.html. To quote them on restaurants part of the chain impact alone: "Restaurants are famously low-margin businesses anyway. Increasing the costs of their wine programs will push some out of business, further reducing outlets for our wines."

Lastly, no U.S. producer of wine would want to face a prospect of their brand capital worldwide being associated with state-imposed tariff 'protection'. Majority of the American winemakers compete on their own creativity, experience, and marketing. In a highly product-differentiated world, hammer-all tax measures do little to help indigenous producers to succeed. They dilute quality of signalling that successful brands develop with their sweat and capital.

To quote, again, the excellent Tablas Creek folks (link above): "Why wouldn’t the wine community just switch its sources to other, non-tariff countries? Wine is not a commodity, where a customer can simply swap in a wine, even one made from the same grape, from one part of the world for another and expect them to be comparable. Wines are products inextricably tied to the place in which they are produced. And the disruption of 100% tariffs on wines from the world’s oldest wine regions would have cascading impacts that would reach deep into a whole network of American businesses, investors, and consumers."

Tuesday, January 7, 2020

7/1/20: Tax cuts, trade and growth: The Trumponomics Effect


My article on U.S. economy and the implied risks to investors for Manning Financial and Cathedral:
https://cfc.ie/2019/12/10/tax-cuts-trade-and-growth-the-trumponomics-effect/.


#USEconomy #Economics #Markets #USgrowth #GlobalGrowth #GlobalEconomy #SecularStagnation @cathedrlfinance @sheehymanning 

7/1/20: BRIC Composite PMIs 4Q 2019



Composite Global economic activity, as measured by Composite PMI has slowed down markedly in 2019 compared to 2018. In 2018, average Composite Global PMI (using quarterly averages) stood at 53.6. This fell back to 51.7 in 2019. In 4Q 2019, average Global Composite activity index stood at 51.3, virtually unchanged on 51.4 in 3Q 2019. Overall, Global Composite PMI has now declined in 7 consecutive quarters. 

This weakness in the Global economic activity is traceable also to BRIC economies.

Brazil’s Composite PMI has fallen from 52.0 in 3Q 2019 to 51.5 in 4Q 2019. Things did improve, however, on the annual average basis, 2018 Composite PMI was at 49.6, and in 2019 the same index averaged 51.4. 

Russia Composite PMI has moved up markedly in 4Q 2019, thanks to booming reading for Services PMI. Russia Composite index rose to 52.7 in 4Q 2019 from 51.0 in 3Q 2019. reaching its highest level in 3 quarters. However, even this robust reading was not enough to move the annual average for 2019 (52.3) to the levels seen in 2018 (54.1). In other words, overall economic activity, as signaled by PMIs, has been slowing in 2019 compared to 2018.

China Composite PMI stood at 52.6 in 4Q 2019, up on 51.5 in 3Q 2019, rising to the highest level in 7 consecutive quarters. However, 2019 average reading was only 51.7 compared to 2018 reading of 52.2, indicating that a pick up in the Chinese economy growth indicators in 4Q 2019 was contrasted by weaker growth over 2019 overall. 

India Composite PMI remained statistically unchanged in 3Q 2019 (52.1) and 4Q 2019 (52.0). On the annual average basis, 2018 reading of 52.5 was marginally higher than 2019 reading o 52.2. 



In 4Q 2019, all BRIC economies have outperformed Global Composite PMI indicator, although Brazil was basically only a notch above the Global Composite PMI average. In 2019 as a whole, China, Russia and India all outperformed Global Composite index activity, with Brazil trailing behind.


Sunday, July 7, 2019

7/7/19: 2Q 2019 BRIC PMIs: The Bad, The Ugly, and The Uglier Still


BRIC PMIs for June are out and with them we have 2Q 2019 figures. And the story they tell is two-fold:

  • Fold 1: There is an ongoing Global-scale slowdown in the economy that is broad, sharp and testing the waters of a mild recession approaching
  • Fold 2: The BRICs are barely providing any upside support to the Global momentum.
Take Manufacturing:

This is simply the 'Uglier' side of the ugly. Global Manufacturing PMI hit 49.8 in 2Q 2019 - statistically, zero growth level, nominally - a manufacturing recession ward, albeit a very shallow one. More ominously, we now 6 consecutive quarters into declining growth reading. Now, per BRICS: Brazil at 50.9 (holding somewhat just above the water line, but down from 53.0 in 1Q 2019); Russia is at 50.1 - basically zero growth and down from 51.3 in 1Q 2019; India is at 52.2, down from 53.6 in 1Q 2019, and China is at 49.9, having delivered four quarters of statistically zero growth readings. So BRIC GDP shares-weighted Manufacturing PMI is at 50.6, which means the overall Manufacturing sector is barely staying afloat on the choppy growth seas. In 1Q 2019 the same was 51.0 and the 2q 2019 reading is at the lowest level since 3Q 2016.

Services sector posted Global PMI at 52.1. Which sounds like 'growth, but is hardly impressive. 2Q 2019 was the weakest since 4Q 2016, and marks the fourth quarter of shrinking PMI readings.


BRICs: Why, they are barely staying above the Global trend. Brazil is in a statistical Services recession at 48.6 in 2Q 2019, the worst reading in 3 consecutive quarters; Russia posted Services PMI of 51.4 in 2Q 2019 - seemingly respectable, but the lowest reading since 4Q 2015; China Services PMI is at 53.1, basically unchanged on 53.0 in 1Q 2019 (about the only 'british' spot); and India is at 50.3, the lowest for any quarter since 1Q 2018.

All of which means that the Composite activity index reading is a bit of debacle:


Overall, Global Composite PMI fell to 51.5 in 1Q 2019, the lowest reading since 2Q 2016. Dynamics are also bad: Global Composite PMI has now declined every quarter since its local peak of 54.2 in 1Q 2018. And the BRICs are in the same boat: Brazil Composite is at 49.3, the lowest reading in 3 quarters; Russia Composite at 51.2, the lowest in 13 quarters; India Composite at 51.4 is the slowest growth signal in seven quarters; and China is at 51.4 for the lowest reading in 8 quarters.

Not a pretty sight... 

Thursday, April 4, 2019

4/4/19: BRIC Services PMIs for 1Q 2019: Converging to Global Growth Momentum


Q1 2019 Services PMIs for BRIC economies came in signaling no change on 4Q 2018 and converging to the Global Services PMI reading.

Brazil Services PMI averaged 52.3 in 1Q 2019, a gain on 51.2 in 4Q 2018, and the highest quarterly reading since 1Q 2013 when it stood at exactly the same reading. 

Russia Services PMI average for 1Q 2019 was at 54.9, down from 55.6 in 4Q 2018, singling moderating, but still fast pace of growth in the Services sectors of the economy. 

China Services PMI was at 53.0 in 1Q 2019, a marginal improvement on 52.8 reading in 4Q 2018, but still substantially down on 53.7 reading in 1Q 2018.

India Services PMI was at 52.2- a slip on 53.0 recorded in 4Q 2018. Given past weakness in Services sector in the Indian economy, 52.2 reading is still respectably tied to the second fastest growth for any quarter since 4Q 2016.

GDP-weighted BRIC Services PMI averaged 53.0 in 1Q 2019, the same reading as in 4Q 2018 and singling marginally faster growth than 52.7 reading for 1Q 2018.

Meanwhile, Global Services PMI averaged 53.2 in 1Q 2019, down marginally on 53.4 in 4Q 2018 and marking the third consecutive quarter of declining growth in global services economy. 

CHART



4/4/19: BRIC Manufacturing PMIs for 1Q 2019: In Line With Global Growth Slowdown



Q1 2019 Manufacturing PMIs for BRIC economies came in as effectively flat on 4Q 2018 and relatively in line with the collapsing Global Manufacturing PMI.

Brazil Manufacturing PMI averaged 53.0 in 1Q 2019, a gain on 52.1 in 4Q 2018, and the highest quarterly reading since 1Q 2011. 

Russia Manufacturing PMI average for 1Q 2019 was at 51.3, down from 51.9 in 4Q 2018, but still the second highest in 5 quarters. 

China Manufacturing PMI was at 49.7 in 1Q 2019, the first sub-50 reading for a quarterly average since 2Q 2016, and the fourth consecutive quarter of declining PMIs.

India Manufacturing PMI was at 53.6 - a gain on 53.4 in 4Q 2018, and the highest reading since 4Q 2012.

GDP-weighted BRIC Manufacturing PMI averaged 51.0 in 1Q 2019, marginally down on 51.2 in 4Q 2018 and singling slower growth than 51.5 reading for 1Q 2018.

Meanwhile, Global Manufacturing PMI averaged 50.7 in 1Q 2019, down significantly on 51.8 in 4Q 2018 and marking the fourth consecutive quarter of declining growth in global manufacturing. 

CHART


4/4/19: BRIC PMIs for March Show Improved Growth Conditions


With March PMIs reported by Markit in, here are the monthly frequency trends for the BRIC economies activity, based on composite PMIs:


Overall BRIC activity as signalled by PMIs remains range-bound in the tight, low activity range over the last 6 years (second chart above). However, the composite activity is running close to the upper bound of the range, implying overall stronger performance in the recent month. This is confirmed by the first chart above, showing that both Russia and ex-Russia BRIC economies activity is accelerating on trend since July 2018.

More analysis, based on smoother quarterly data forthcoming, so stay tuned.

Monday, March 4, 2019

4/3/19: BRIC Manufacturing PMI: January-February Trend


In January-February 2019, Global manufacturing PMI sunk to its lowest reading since 2Q 2016 averaging 50.7 over the first two months of the year. With it, the slowdown has also been impacting the BRIC economies, overall BRIC Manufacturing PMIs average 41.2 in 4Q 2018 based on each country share of the global GDP for 2018, below 51.83 average for Global Manufacturing PMI over the same period. In the first two months of 2019, BRIC Manufacturing PMI was around 50.8, statistically indistinguishable from the 50.7 Global PMI average.


As the chart above clearly indicates, poor BRIC performance was driven by a contraction-territory reading for China (49.1 in January-February 2019 as opposed to stagnation-signalling 50.0 in 4Q 2018), and Russia (50.5 for the first two months of 2019, against 4Q 2018 average of 51.9). In contrast, both Brazil and India outperformed BRIC and Global PMI readings. Brazil's Manufacturing PMI averaged 53.1 in the first two months of 2019 against 52.1 in 4Q 2018, while India's PMI rose to 54.1 in January-February this year against 53.4 in 4Q 2018.

All in, Manufacturing sector leading indicator suggests a major slowdown in the Global growth momentum, and some spillover of this slowdown to Russia and China.  Brazil's robust reading so far marks the fastest pace of expansion since 1Q 2010, on foot of a recovery from a very long and painful recession. India's reading is the highest since 2Q 2012. If confirmed over March and over Services PMI, this implies a major diversion of growth momentum within the BRIC group.

Friday, October 19, 2018

19/10/18: IMF's Woeful Record in Forecasting: Denying Secular Stagnation Hypothesis


A recent MarketWatch post by Ashoka Mody, @AshokaMody, detailing the absurdities of the IMF growth forecasts is a great read (see https://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-imf-is-still-too-optimistic-about-global-growth-and-thats-bad-news-for-investors-2018-10-15?mod=mw_share_twitter).  Mody's explanation for the IMF forecasters' failures is also spot on, linking these errors to the Fund's staunch desire not to see the declining productivity growth rates (aka, supply side secular stagnation).

So, to add to Mody's analysis, here are two charts showing the IMF's persistent forecasting errors over the last four years (first chart), set against the trend and the cumulative over-estimate of global economic activity by the Fund since mid-2008 (second chart):




While the first chart simply plots IMF forecasting errors, the second chart paints the picture fully consistent with Mody's analysis: the IMF forecasts have missed global economic activity by a whooping cumulative USD10 trillion or full 1/8th of the size of the global economy, between 2008 and 2018. These errors did not occur because of the Global Financial Crisis and the high degree of uncertainty associated with it. Firstly, the forecasting errors relating to the GFC have occurred during the period when the crisis extent was becoming more visible. Secondly, post GFC, the hit rates of IMF forecasts have deteriorated even more than during the GFC. As Mody correctly points out, Fund's forecasts got progressively more and more detached from reality.

At this stage, looking at April and October 2018 forecasts from the Fund's WEO updates implies virtually zero credibility in the core IMF's thesis of a 'soft landing' for the global economy over 2019-2021 time horizon.