Showing posts with label Irish tax policies. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Irish tax policies. Show all posts

Friday, October 6, 2017

6/10/17: CA&G on Ireland's Tax, Banking Costs & Recovery


Occasionally, the Irish Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) office produces some remarkable, in their honesty, and the extent of their disclosures, reports. Last month gave us one of those moment.

There are three key findings by CA&G worth highlighting.

The first one relates to corporate taxation, and the second one to the net cost of banking crisis resolution. The third one comes on foot of tax optimisation-led economy that Ireland has developed since the 1990s, most recently dubbed the Leprechaun Economics by Paul Krugman that resulted in a dramatic increase in Irish contributions to the EU budget (computed as a share of GDP) just as the Irish authorities were forced to admit that MNCs’ chicanery, not real economic activity, accounted for 1/3 of the Irish economy. All three are linked:

  • Irish banking crisis was enabled by the combination of a property bubble that was co-founded by tax optimisation running rampant across Irish economic development model since the 1990s; and by loose money / capital flows within the EU, which was part and parcel of our membership in the euro area. The same membership supported our FDI-focused competitive advantage.
  • Irish recovery from the banking crisis was largely down to non-domestic factors, aka - tax optimisation-driven FDI and foreign companies activities, plus the loose money / capital flows within the EU enabled by the ECB.
  • In a way, as Ireland paid a hefty price for European imbalances and own tax-driven economic development model in 2007-2012, so it is paying a price today for the same imbalances and the same development model-led recovery.



Let’s take the CA&G report through a summary and some comments.


1) Framing CA&G analysis, we had a recent study by World Bank and PwC that estimated Ireland’s effective rate of corporation tax at 12.4%, just 0.1 per cent below the statutory or headline rate of 12.5%. To put this into perspective, if 12.4% effective rate holds, Ireland is not the lowest tax jurisdiction in the OECD, as 12 OECD economies had an effective rate below 12.4% and 21 had an effective rate of corporation tax above 12.4%. For the record, based on 2015 data, France had the 2nd-highest statutory rate at 38% but the lowest effective rate at just 0.4%. I contrast, the U.S. had the highest statutory tax rate at 39% and the second highest effective rate at 28.1%. There is a lot of fog around Irish effective corporate tax rates, but CA&G The C&AG found that the top 100 in taxable income terms companies had a an average effective corporation tax rate at 9.3%, slightly less than the rate applying to all companies (9.8%).

The CA&G findings show some dramatic variation in the effective tax rates paid by the Ireland-based corporations. CA&G report is based on a set of top 100 companies trading from Ireland. Of these, 79 companies paid an effective corporate tax rate of 10-15 percent, and almost 2/3rds paid a rate of 12% and higher. However, 13 companies faced a tax rate of under 1 percent.

Irish corporate tax system is risk-loaded: per CA&G report, 37% of all corporate tax receipts collected by the Irish Exchequer come from just 10 companies, while top 100 firms supply 70% of total corporate tax receipts. This concentration is coincident with rising reliance of the Exchequer on corporate tax collections, as corporation tax contributions to the State rose 49% in 2015 to reach EUR6.9 billion. The Leprechaun Economics that triggered a massive transfer of foreign assets into Ireland in 2015-2016 has pushed corporate tax receipts to account for 15% of the total tax revenues. Worse, 70% of total corporate tax take in Ireland came from only three sectors: finance, manufacturing and ICT. Manufacturing, of course, includes pharma sector and biopharma, while ICT is dominated by services, like Google, Facebook, Airbnb et al. This reliance on corporate tax revenues is the 6th highest in the OECD, based on 2015 figures. Per CA&G report, “Corporation tax receipts are highly concentrated both in terms of sectors and by number of taxpayers”. In other words, the Leprechaun Economics model is wrought with risks of a sudden stop in Exchequer revenues, should global flows of funds and assets into Ireland reverse (e.g. due to EU disruption, such as policy shift or Brexit/geopolitical triggers, or due to the U.S.-led shock, such as radical changes in the U.S. corporate tax regime).

The above is worrying. Leprechaun Economics model - or as I suggested years ago, the Curse of Tax Optimisation model - for economic development, chosen by Ireland is not sustainable and it is open to severe risks of exogenous shocks. Such shocks can be sudden and deep. And were risks to the MNCs domiciling into Ireland to materialise, the Exchequer can see double digit deficits virtually over night.


2) CA&G report also attempts to compute the net expected cost of the banking crisis to the country. Per report, the expected cost of rescuing the banks stands at around EUR 40 billion as of the end of 2016, while on the long run timing, the cost is expected to be EUR56.4 billion. However, accounting for State assets (banks’ shares), Nama ‘surpluses’ and other receipts, the long term net cost falls just below EUR40 billion. At the end of 2016, per CA&G, the value of the State's share in AIB was EUR11.6bn, which was prior to the 29% stake sale in an IPO of the bank. As history tells us, EUR66.8 billion was used to recapitalise the Irish banks with another EUR14.8 billion paid out in debt servicing costs. The debt servicing bill currently runs at around EUR1 billion on average, and that is likely to rise dramatically once the ECB starts unwinding its QE which effectively subsidises Irish Exchequer.

CA&G report accounted for debt servicing costs in its calculation of the total expected cost of banks bailouts, but it failed to account for the fact that these debt costs are perpetual. Ireland does not retire debt when it retires bonds, but predominantly uses new borrowings to roll over debt. hence, debts incurred from banks recapitalisations are perpetual. CA&G report also fails to a account for the opportunity cost of NPRF funds that were used to refinance Irish banks. NPRF funds generated tangible long term returns that were foregone in the bailout. Any economic - as opposed to accounting - analysis of the true costs of Irish banks bailouts must account for opportunity costs and for perpetual debt finance costs.

As a reminder, the State still owns remaining investments in AIB (71% shareholding), Bank of Ireland (14%) and Permanent TSB (75%) which CA&G estimated to be worth EUR13.6 billion. One way this might go is up: if recovery is sustained into the next 3-5 years, the state shares will see appreciation in value. The other way it might turn a decline: these are sizeable shareholdings and disposing off them in the markets will trigger hefty discounts on market share prices. CA&G expects Nama to generate a surplus of EUR3 billion. This is uncertain, to put it mildly, because Nama might not window any time soon, but morph instead into something else, e.g. ’social housing developer’ or into a general “development finance’ vehicle - watch their jostling for a role in ‘resolving’ the housing crisis. If it does, the surplus will be forced, most likely, into some sort of a development finance structure and, although recorded on paper, will be used to pay continued Nama wages and costs.

In simple terms, the CA&G figure is an accounting underestimate of the true net cost of the bailouts and it is also a gross economic underestimate of the same.


3) As noted above, the third aspect of the CA&G report worth mentioning is the rapid acceleration in Ireland’s overpayment to the EU on foot of the rapid superficial GDP expansion of 2015-2016 period. According to CA&G, Ireland’s contributions to the EU rose to EUR2 billion - up 20% y/y - in 2016. This increase was largely driven by the fake growth in GDP that arises from the multinational companies shifting assets into Ireland for tax purposes. CA&G expects this figure to rise to EUR2.4 billion in 2017.

In simple terms, Ireland is overpaying for the EU membership to the tune of EUR1 billion - an overpayment necessitated by the MNCs-induced superficial expansion of the national accounts. This activity has zero impact on the ground, but it induces a real cost on Irish society. Of course, one can as easily make an argument that our beggar-thy-neighbour tax policies are conditional on us being within the EU, so we are paying extra for the privilege of housing all corporate tax optimisers in Ireland.


All in, the CA&G report is a solid attempt at making sense of the Kafkaesque economics of the Irish State. That it deserves some critical comments should not subtract from its value and the quality of effort.

Wednesday, August 23, 2017

23/8/17: Ireland: A Haven for SPVs?


Ireland scored another ‘first’ in the league tables relating to tax optimisation and avoidance, staying at the top of the Euro area rankings as a Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) destination: http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-ireland-funds-idUKKCN1AY1AK (featuring my comment, amongst others).

As my comment in the article linked above alludes, there is a combination of factors that is driving Ireland’s ‘competitiveness’ in this area. Some are positive for the economy and non-zero-game in relation to our trading partners, e.g. 
- Ireland providing a functional access to the European markets via regulatory and markets infrastructure arrangements that facilitate trading from Dublin into the rest of the EEC;
- Ireland offering a strong platform for on-shoring human capital, a much more functional platform than any other EU nation, due to greater openness to skills-based migration, English language, common law and open culture;
- Ireland serves as a clustering centre for a range of financial services functions, making it more attractive than traditional tax havens for conducting real business.

Over the recent decades, Irish Governments and business organisations have been aggressive (or better said - active) in positioning the country as a platform for inward investment. The first waves of this strategy involved emphasis on pure tax optimisation (e.g. during the 1990s), with subsequent efforts (often less successful and slower to develop) involving building specialist niches of financial services activities in Ireland (e.g. funds management in the 2000s and focus on specialist listings, such as debt and SPVs, in the 2000s-2010s).

On the other hand, aggressive positioning achieved by Ireland in tax optimisation-driven FDI and tax-focused corporate inversions has become a significant drag on the country’s reputation as a functional (as opposed to post-box) business centre. In addition, the Financial Crisis has introduced new dimensions to this reputational erosion: in addition to the G20-initiated push for greater tax transparency and harmonisation, Ireland also - mistakenly - pursued tax-based incentives for vulture funds acquiring distressed Irish properties from the likes of Nama and IBRC. A combination of growing tax inversions, BEPS reviews and reforms, vulture funds aggressive use of the tax structures has resulted in a more recent tightening of the SPVs regulations and oversight. 

Striking a balance between real economic incentives and egregious tax optimisation is a hard target to hit for a small open economy that, like Ireland, faces very tangible and aggressive international competition. The bad news is that we are yet to find a ‘golden ratio’ for proper regulation and supervision regimes that can allow us to retain a competitive edge, while rebuilding positive reputation with our trading partners and investors as a place for doing functional/tangible business. The good news is that we are becoming more aware of the need to strike such a balance.



Saturday, July 26, 2014

26/7/2014: This Week in Corporate 'Not Tax Haven' News



Earlier today I wrote about the round of 'assert-deny' salvos fired across Ireland's deck by German economic policy adviser and the Department of Finance (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/07/2672014-of-germans-bearing-ugly-truth.html). This was hardly the only defensive that Ireland Inc had to run this week. A much larger one came on foot of the US President Barak Obama singling Ireland out as the key global player in the dirty game of corporate tax inversions.

Newsflow was not too generous to Ireland on this front (corporate tax evasion and optimisation) this week.

It started with a report by Reuters (http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/24/deals-taxinversions-lawfirms-idUSL2N0PK1L820140724) on how Irish legal eagles are leading the way in advertising this land of human capital and regulation arbitrage riches as a [not a] tax haven. Singled out in the report are: Arthur Cox, A&L Goodbody, and Matheson. But other firms are into this game too. And not just in the US. In fact, there are plenty 'country specialists' employed in the legal offices in Ireland and around the world, tasked with 'selling' Ireland's 'unique competitiveness points' to potential clients interested in optimising their tax exposures.

Obama weighted in later in the week and, of course, the Government had to weigh in with a hefty doses of 'we deny we do it': http://www.businessworld.ie/bworld/livenews.htm?a=3192721 and http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/25/ireland-tax-inversions-idUSL6N0Q03LS20140725

The problem is that denying direct Government involvement is hardly a defence. Facts are: Ireland is being promoted as a tax optimisations destination and not solely on foot of our headline 12.5% tax rate. This promotion is known, brazen and visible, and it comes via law firms with direct links - contractual and advisory - the the Government and the State.

And the stakes, relating to the above promotion, are high: http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/accountants-warn-tax-changes-could-harm-investment-30457978.html on policy side and on business side: http://www.independent.ie/irish-news/google-pays-27m-corporation-tax-on-17bn-revenue-30458696.html

In short, things are ugly and are going to get even more ugly as OECD is preparing road maps for addressing more egregious abuses, while the US, UK, EU, European member states and even Australia and Japan are now firmly in the need to 'do something' about losses of Government revenues arising from sharp tax optimisation practices. Irish Government can put as many junior ministers as it wants onto RTE to talk about Ireland being 'unfairly singled-out' or 'misunderstood' or whatever else, but

  1. Fact remains fact: tax arbitrage policies of this state are starting to cost us dearly in reputation and actual economic costs (http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/06/2562014-imf-on-corporate-tax-spillovers.html and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/06/1762014-irelands-regulatory-resource.html and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/02/822014-yahoos-tax-base-err-optimisation.html and http://trueeconomics.blogspot.ie/2014/01/2112014-no-special-ict-services-tax-but.html)
  2. We are but a small open economy caught (due to our own fault) in between the irate giants who not only set global policies, but also control our access to markets and investment

Time for us to stop playing ostriches with our ministers, but to get into the game of leading the reforms at home and internationally.

Thursday, June 20, 2013

20/6/2013: Some facts about income inequality in Ireland and across OECD

Here's an interesting chart from the OECD's latest analysis of income inequality changes during the crisis:

Chart: Market income inequality rose considerably (Percentage point changes in the Gini coefficient of household market and disposable incomes between 2007 and 2010)



While Ireland ranks 1st in terms of overall gross income inequality increases during the crisis (primarily driven by the changes in the employment composition by tenure during the recession and the asymmetric recovery/price dynamics in assets markets between property and equities), we rank 9th in terms of after-tax disposable income inequality. Put differently, tax hikes did impact disproportionately those better off, so much so, they offset asymmetric income changes (including for income from assets).

This effect is partially reflected in the chart below:

Chart: Taxes and social transfers mitigated falls in market income in most OECD countries (Annual percentage changes in household disposable income between 2007 and 2010, by income component)


As things stood in 2010 (major caveats apply here), Ireland's levels of income inequality are actually below the OECD average:

Chart: There are large differences in levels of income inequality across OECD countries (Gini coefficient of household disposable income and gap between richest and poorest 10%, 2010)

Although our income inequality is above that for all EU countries, save Italy, Estonia, Greece, Spain, UK, and Portugal. In comparative across the English-speaking OECD states, we are ranked in the 1st place in terms of having the lowest levels of income inequality.

Loads of fascinating analysis on the topic here: www.oecd.org/els/soc/OECD2013-Inequality-and-Poverty-8p.pdf


Wednesday, October 5, 2011

05/10/2011: Tax burden distribution: Q3 2011

Tax profile for September yielded another sign of continued shift in tax burden onto the shoulders of ordinary households, courtesy of:

  1. Continued underperformance in corporate tax returns despite booming exports activity
  2. Continued graft of household budgets under the USC and levies.
Overall tax burden in Q3 2011 has shifted as follows:



  • Q2 2011 share of Income tax receipts in total receipts was 39.52%. Q3 2011 share of Income tax receipts in total receipts was 38.40% against Q3 2010 share of 33.20% and Q3 2007 share of 28.04%
  • Q2 2011 share of VAT receipts in total receipts was 33.22%. Q3 2011 share of VAT receipts in total receipts was 33.17% against Q3 2010 share of 36.81% and Q3 2007 share of 37.41%
  • Q2 2011 share of Corporation tax receipts in total receipts was 9.32%. Q3 2011 share of Corporation tax receipts in total receipts was 8.52% against Q3 2010 share of 9.86% and Q3 2007 share of 7.39%
  • Q2 2011 share of Excise receipts in total receipts was 14.4%. Q3 2011 share of Excise receipts in total receipts was 13.4% against Q3 2010 share of 14.77% and Q3 2007 share of 13.79%
  • Stamps, CGT and CAT combined share in Q2 2011 was 2.64% against Q3 2011 share of 5.67% and 4.73% in Q3 2010 and 12.67% in Q3 2007.
Charts to illustrate:

Tuesday, July 12, 2011

12/07/2011: Irish Tax Rates in International Perspective - Part 2

More tax comparatives, courtesy of OECD dataset. Note, these refer to 2009 tax returns.

In the previous post (here), I provided some assessments of the overall taxation burden in Ireland compared to EU27, plus Norway, Israel and Switzerland. Now, let's look at components of the total taxes.

First - taxes on production:
What this chart above tells us is that we are not distinct from the sample average in terms of our taxes on production expressed as a function of GNP, while we are below average when expressed in terms of GDP:
  • Total production and imports tax revenues in Ireland stood at 14.0% of GNP and 11.5% GDP in 2009. Sample average stood at 13.1% (median 13.0%) and +/- 0.5 STDEV band is (11.0, 14.4). So Irish taxes on production and imports as a share of GNP were above sample average. Again, for comparison : Switzerland was at 6.8% of GDP, while Sweden at 19.0%.
  • Total production and imports tax revenues are broken down into Taxes on Products, and Other Taxes on Production. Taxes on Products in Ireland yielded 12.4% of GNP and 10.2% of GDP against sample average of 11.6% (median 11.3%), with +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean of (10.6,12.7). Again, Irish tax yields here were within the band when expressed in terms of GNP and below the mean when expressed against GDP. Other Taxes on Products (other than Vat, Import Duties and direct taxes on products) accounted for 1.3% of GDP and 1.6% of GNP - against the mean of 1.5% and the +/- 0.5 STDEV band of (0.9,2.1). Neither GDP nor GNP comparative here was out of line with the mean.
  • Taxes on Products mentioned above can be further broken down into Vat, Taxes & Duties on Imports (ex-Vat), Taxes on products ex-Vat & Import taxes. VAT in Ireland in 2009 accounted for 6.4% of GDP and 7.8% of GNP. Sample average here was 7.3% with +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean of (6.6,8.0), median of 7.4, which means that Irish Vat receipts were in line with the sample average in terms of GNP, but below the mean in terms of GDP. In terms of Taxes on products ex-Vat & Import taxes, the same picture holds. In terms of taxes and Duties on Imports ex-Vat, Irish receipts were above the mean (statistically significantly) for both GDP and GNP measures.
Next, Irish Times / ESRI / Trade Unions' favorite taxes on Income and Wealth:
Remember, we allegedly have very low taxes on these and more needs to be extracted out of the 'Irish rich' :
  • Total current taxes on income and wealth in Ireland stood at 10.7% of GDP and 13% of GNP. This compares against the sample average of 11.9% of GDP (median of 10.8%) with +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean of(9.3, 14.5). In other words, our taxes were slightly (but statistically insignificantly) above average in terms of GNP and also slightly (and again statistically insignificantly) below average in terms of GDP.
  • The above can be broken down into Taxes on Income, and Other Current Taxes. Taxes on income yielded 12.5% of GNP and 10.3% of GDP. Both are within sample average range: sample average was 11.3%, +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean was (8.8,13.8) and median was 10.4%. Other current taxes were small at 0.4% of GDP and 0.5% of GNP, but also within the range of the mean of 0.6% of GDP.
  • Capital taxes came in within the mean range in terms of both GDP and GNP comparatives.
  • Total income tax related receipts and capital taxes accounted for 22.4% of GDP and 27.2% of GNP in Ireland in 2009. The sample average was 25.2% and the median was 24.4%. +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean was (22.0, 28.5), which means that our income and wealth taxes were solidly within the range of the mean for both GDP and GNP measures. An interesting coincidence - Swiss and Netherlands' taxes in this heading were bang on identical as a function of GDP to ours.
Social Contributions taxes:
Now, keep in mind that social contributions are meant to pay for social protection services. For which we, in Ireland, should have lower demand than in other states of EU due to younger population, but the demand on social welfare side does offset this due to a spike in unemployment. Social protection taxes in Ireland have also been dramatically increased in Budget 2011 - not reflected in the data above.
  • Social Contributions is the largest component of the tax receipts here, with Irish contributions accounting for 7.0% of GNP and 5.8% of GDP. The mean was 10.6 and the median 11.2, while +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean was (8.7,12.5). This means Irish Social Contributions overall were below the mean in terms of GDP and GNP.
  • Let's take a look as to why. Our Employers' contributions (at 3.3% of GDP and 4.0% of GNP against the mean of 6.3% and band of (4.9, 7.7)) fell short of the mean in terms of GDP and GNP. The same was true for our Contributions by self- and non-employed (o.2% of GDP and GNP against the average of 1.1% with the median of 0.7% and the band of (0.6, 1.6)).
  • The above 'below average" performance was offset slightly by the Employees Contributions which came in at 2.3% of GDP and 2.8% of GNP against the mean of 3.2% with the median of 3.1% and +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean of (2.4, 4.1). In other words, our Employees Contribution is within the average for GNP metric, but below the average for GDP metric.

So now on to the overall tax burden in this economy. As highlighted in the previous post, our total tax revenue stood at 35.9% of GNP and 29.6% of GDP. The average for the sample was 36.5% against the median of 35.9%. The +/- 0.5 STDEV band around the mean was (33.5, 39.6) which means that our overall tax burden
  • expressed as a function of GNP was bang on with the median, and statistically indistinguishable from the mean;
  • ex pressed as a function of GDP was statistically significantly below the mean.
Again, folks, the data above shows that by virtually all comparisons, we are a country with average tax burdens - not a low tax economy.

Sunday, July 10, 2011

10/07/2011: Irish Tax Rates in International Perspective

Some interesting international comparisons for tax revenues across the EU27, plus Israel, Norway and Switzerland (no Iceland, sadly), courtesy of the OECD dataset - last updated April 27, 2011. I added Ireland's tax ratios relative to GNP based on CSO data for all the years 1999-2009.

Let's run some comparisons:
  • In 1999, total tax revenues in Ireland were 33.2% of GDP and 38.9 GNP which compares to 37.% of GDP for the simple average of 30 countries in the sample and 37.2 median. There was a slight (0.3) skew in the data. With a standard deviation of 7.0 that year, Irish tax/GNP ratio was well within the average, which is confirmed by the rank attained by Ireland as 12th highest tax economy in the group.
  • In 2003, total tax revenues in Ireland were 30.3% of GDP, which of course would be consistent with FF/PDs 'low tax' policies the Left is keen of accusing them of. Alas same year total tax revenue in Ireland stood at 35.9% GNP which compares to 36.7% of GDP for the simple average of 30 countries in the sample and 36 median. So as Irish tax revenue as a share of economy declined, so did the sample average. The new skew was 0.2 lower than in 1999. Hence, with a standard deviation of 6.5 that year, Irish tax/GNP ratio was again well within the average - actually even closer to the average - which is confirmed by the rank attained by Ireland as 16th highest tax economy in the group.
  • Now, note that within both of the above years, in terms of GDP comparative, Irish taxes were ranked 22nd and 26th highest in the sample.
  • Zoom on to 2007 when Irish tax revenues accounted for 32.0% of GDP and 38.8% of GNP against the sample average of 38% of GDP and a standard deviation of 5.8. There was zero skewness that year. Once again, there was no statistical difference between Irish tax rates and the average. Ireland ranked 25th highest tax economy in comparison against GDP and 14th in comparison to GNP.
  • 2009 is the latest year we have comparatives for and in that year, Irish Government tax revenue accounted for 29.6% of GDP and 35.9% of GNP, which (GNP figure) again was statistically indistinguishable from the mean which was 36.7% (with standard deviation of 6.1 and skew of 0.2).
So now, let's map the above data:
Notice the following features of the above chart:
  • Irish tax returns as a function GDP are more volatile than in terms of GNP - in fact historical standard deviation for Irish tax revenues in terms of GDP is 1.406 against that for GNP of 1.210. The median standard deviation for the sample of 30 countries is 0.736.
  • Irish tax returns as a function of GDP are always statistically significantly different from the average, but our tax returns as a function of GNP are never once outside the average. In other words, folks, our tax burdens are average. Not low, not high - average.
  • Only within the period of 2001-2003 did our tax returns as measured in relation to GNP fall statistically significantly below those for Euro area (EA17).
Let's put our tax revenues against some comparable countries. I divided the following two charts into Small Open Economies that are members of the Euro area and those that are not:
Interestingly, for the Euro are countries, Sweden, Belgium, Austria and Finland have tax burdens in excess of the average (note they are above the 1/2 STDEV band relating to the mean. Notice that all of the countries in that group, with exception of debt-ridden Belgium, are experiencing declines in their tax burden since 1999. Apparently, to the chagrin of our friends in the Trade Unions, Tasc and Irish Times - the ones so keen on shouting about the FF/PD coalition tax policies - the Nordics too were run by right-wing free-marketeers.

Next, notice the countries within the trace band around the mean - these are the Netherlands, Lux, Slovenia, Ireland (GNP), Portugal and Czech. Greece has dropped below the average range around 2004. It's an interesting neighborhood we are in, which includes highly aggressive tax competitor such as the Netherlands.

Lastly, we have a truly aggressively competitive Slovakia.

So again, there is no evidence in sight that Ireland is or was a low tax haven.

Now, for non-Euro countries:
Speaks for itself, but let me cover one little point. Switzerland has ranked within lowest 5 tax economies in 10 out of 11 years between 1999 and 2009. The country with functional public services and great public infrastructure has managed its affairs on the average tax revenues of just 29.3% of its GDP against the average of 31.7% of GDP and 37.5% of GNP for Ireland. So, really, folks, cut this crap about 'low taxes have ruined Irish economy/society'. The Swiss do it on less than us, better than us and achieve great social cohesion, civility and cultural development while using three languages where we can't master two. It's not in how much you spend, it's how you spend it.

Thursday, June 2, 2011

03/05/11: Exchequer receipts for May

Exchequer returns for May are in and the results are pretty much in line with everyone's expectations. On the surface things are improving, but in reality, our fiscal problems are not going away.

Here's the analysis of receipts (analysis of expenditure will follow in a separate post):
  • Income tax receipts came in at €5.061bn inclusive of the USC, which is 9.2% above 2009 levels and 19.93% above 2010 level. How much of this is due to USC and how much was substituted away from other sources of revenue, such as health levies etc.

  • VAT receipts offer a more direct comparative - VAT receipts stood at €4.867bn in May 2011 slightly down on €4.873bn a year ago.
  • Corporate tax receipts - another gauge of economic activity, this time dominated by MNCs - are down: May 2011 level was €599mln, as opposed to €748mln a year ago. Thus Corporate tax receipts are down 19.92% on 2010 and 47.41% on 2009. For comparative purpose, May 2008 receipts were €1.357bn - more than double 2011 levels, while 2007 receipts were €1.484bn.

  • Excise tax receipts came in at €1.791bn in May, slightly up on May 2010 when they reached €1.704bn, the variation of 5.1% yoy, the receipts are also up on May 2009 - by 2.11%.
  • Stamps continue unabated decline - down to €235mln in May 2011 or 3.69% yoy and 20.07% on 2009. To put things into perspective, May 2007 stamps were €1.438bn.

  • Capital taxes are really taking a serious dive. CGT is down 25.23% year on year and 56.09% on 2009, reaching just €83mln in May 2011. CAT is down 66.09% yoy and 63.21% on 2009 at €39mln in May 2011. Combined CGT and CAT stood at €1.168bn in May 2007, €744mln in May 2008, €295mln in May 2009, €226mln in May 2010 and €122mln in May 2011. Ouch - that global capex boom of 2010 has clearly passed Ireland untouched and this can only mean one thing - we are into the 4th year of collapsed investment now.
  • Lastly, customs duties stood at €98mln in May, 18.1% up yoy

  • Total tax receipts, therefore, came in at €12.795bn in 5 months through May 2011. This is 5.6% above the level of tax receipts for the same period of 2010 and 5.43% below 2009.

  • The Exchequer deficit for the five months through May 2011 now stands at €10.231bn inclusive of €3.060bn promisory notes capital injections to INBS and Anglo in March. May 2010 deficit was €7.867bn (ex-banks) and 2009 deficit for the period was €10.588bn.
So on the net, tax receipts suggest to me that economic activity has stalled. All comparable tax heads across years relating to economic growth - corporate tax, VAT, capital taxes - are performing either in line with 2010 or below. The only significant increases in tax heads are where new taxes were implemented and some of these are in effect transfers from non-tax receipts side, implying that increase in tax receipts via USC, for example, includes transfer of health levy which has an effect of increasing expenditure side.

Sunday, January 9, 2011

09/01/2011: Exchequer returns - Part 6

This is the sixth post on Exchequer returns for 2010 (previous parts are here: part 1, part 2, part 3, part 4 and part 5).

This time around, I am going to take a closer look at the incidence of taxation across various tax heads and agents of economy.

During the year, I have been consistently highlighting the problem of rising burden of taxation for the households - the core agency of any economy. In particular, the rising burden of income taxation. Here are two charts - one comparing 2007-2010 at H1 end and another comparing same years at year end:

Table below summarizes:
Interestingly, Minister Lenihan in his address relating to the release of December returns has gone out of his way to highlight two things:
  • Increase in corporate tax returns, and
  • Decrease in income tax returns
Minister Lenihan would be better served if he were to look at the 2007-2010 comparatives, which clearly show that his Government's policies have shifted massive new burden for carrying public expenditure onto the shoulders of ever-shrinking (remember latest Live Register results?) pool of working households. At the same time, corporate tax contributions to overall tax receipts have declined on 2007 (albeit insignificantly).

Let's highlight this for him, taking into account that both businesses and households are paying more than just corporate and income taxes:

No comment needed!

09/01/2011: Exchequer returns - Part 5

In a follow up to the previous 4 posts on Exchequer returns (part 1, part 2, part 3 and part 4), let me update my own earlier charts on receipts to cover 2007-2010 horizon. There are some striking comparatives to had out of these.

First by tax head:

Now, totals
And now, let's carry out two exercises. First, consider changes year on year and over 2007-2010 horizon:
The second exercise is in the bottom section of the table above. Suppose we fix tax revenues at the levels of 2007 (case 1) and at 85% of 2007 (case 2) levels. The choice for 85% is warranted as it roughly speaking represents a 50% moderation in housing price growth activity on 2005-2007 - not a housing recession, but slower rate of growth. In other words, this is equilibrium effect. What would have been the Exchequer shortfall in funding given the path of expenditure taken by the Government over 2007-2010?

As shown above, between 2008 and 2010 the Government would have to cut expenditure by some €10.3 billion in order to bring fiscal balance to the receipts fixed annually at 85% of 2007 levels. And these are net cuts! Alternatively, only €13 billion of the total cumulative 2008-2010 deficits of €49.1 billion can be accounted for by a decline in tax revenue below equilibrium level. The rest, my friends, is due to over-spending...

Saturday, January 8, 2011

08/01/2011: Exchequer returns - part 4

Corrected - hat tip for an error to Seamus Coffey.


In Part 1 of the post on 2010 Exchequer returns I looked at a couple of headline points relating to the issue of Ireland's fiscal policy performance in 2010 (here). Part 2 of the post dealt with my forecasts and longer term analysis of fiscal environment in Ireland (here). Part 3 focused on the expenditure side of the Government balancesheet (here).

In this part, let's tackle the issues relating to tax receipts.

Again, the main headline picture first:

As the chart above clearly shows, the idea of 'stabilizing' tax revenue relates to the Government view that replicating previous year performance - albeit at a slightly lower levels - is somehow a good thing.

Amazingly, 2010 absolute underperformance of the already abysmal 2009 comes after a host of tax hikes and levies introductions by the Budgets 2009 and 2010. Minister Lenihan has been pushing ever increasing tax burden onto the Irish economy, while getting less and less revenue in return.

Relative to 2009 and 2008:
  • Income tax was down 4.72% and 14.43% respectively
  • VAT is down 5.33% and 24.79% respectively
  • Corporate tax - the one Minister Lenihan has been singing praises about this week - is up 0.606% on 2009, but down a massive 22.55% on 2008
Here are few charts by main tax heads:

Of course, given investment and housing markets performance, stamps, CGT, CAT etc are showing continued strain as well:

Of course, CGT is a reflection of economy's performance on investment side. Here, there is clearly no recovery in sight.

Dynamics year on year:

All of which means that year on year performance is now 'stabilizing' around 2009 dynamics. Again, one might say the glass is 1/10th full (things are not getting much worse than 2009) or 9/10ths empty (things are not getting any better).

One thing that remains stable throughout the crisis is Government's determination to load the burden of fiscal adjustment onto ordinary taxpayers:

Table below summarizes the above point:

And, for conclusion, let's indulge in the Government's own fetish of focusing on performance relative to target (not that there is much of an economic meaning to this):

Monday, December 28, 2009

Economics 28/12/2009: Irish Earners - amongst highest taxed

Ireland now has some of the highest tax rates in the developed world, and this tax burden shows one of the highest rates of progressivity when it comes to the state dipping into higher earners incomes. Table below illustrates (source here):
Note how dramatic is the tax burden for higher earners in Ireland.

Now, give it a thought. We want to build a 'knowledge' economy. The main input into such an economy is individual skills of the employees. This high skills-intensity of production in the 'knowledge' economy means paying key employees more than in the 'dumb' traditional economy, where physical capital takes up much larger share of total value added. In other words, 'knowledge' economy must compete globally for human capital. The higher the quality of the talent, the greater is the intensity of competition and thus, the more important are the tax rates charged on such labour. Our tax rates simply are inconsistent with such competitiveness.

Funny thing is that most of our media - especially the Irish Times and RTE - keep on banging about the need for creating a vibrant 'knowledge' economy, while at the same time calling for higher taxes on top earners in the private sector.

Given that both papers have absolutely no real economics analysts on board, this contradiction is not surprising - it takes a real economist, with a wide knowledge of economic theory and empirical analysis, to understand the complex nature of productivity and returns to various forms of capital. Ex-banks folks and ex-political correspondents simply won't do here.

Sunday, November 15, 2009

Economics 15/11/2009: When Ryanair gets serious...

Per my continued opposition to absurd tax measures, see the following statement from Ryanair and my comment below:

Apart from landing another rainy cloud on Mrs Coughlan's fine parade (after all it does call Tanaiste out as being somewhat disingenuous in her claims), this statement is worth looking at a bit closer:

If the Irish economy is losing €600mln in tourism revenue, the VAT on this loss will likely be ca €80-100mln (as some services bear reduced VAT). This is the first round of losses to the Exchequer.

But every euro spent by a tourist in this country goes to pay for goods and services here, which in turn generates banks deposits and payments to suppliers. These payments are then used to generate new economic activity, thus triggering a second round of tax receipts. And the merry-go-round then goes on to the third round and so on. 

Given the average OECD private spending multiplier is approximately equal to the M1/M3 multiplier, which is roughly 3.8-6 (depending on the range of years chosen, with the lower number coincidentally referring to the years of the most recent global markets boom), then these losses are indeed much greater than those claimed in Ryanair note. 

Back of the envelope calculation suggests the Exchequer will be foregoing some €120-250 million more in revenue on top of the first round losses. And this is before we factor in income taxes and other taxes, such as charges on fuel that foreign motorists might pay while touring Ireland.

So we are now back to the old equation: put a €10 tax in place, lose some €100-230 million in revenue. Good luck running the country with these mathematics...

Note: that article attacking my and Ryanair analysis of the travel figures that predicted the yet-to-materialise substitution effects of Irish travel tax is available from the Irish Times site (here).